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1. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical psychology, broadly conceived, is the study of all mind-like 
behavior wherever it may arise. In this sense, the subject matter of theoretical 
psychology includes artificial mental mechanisms as well as those mental 
mechanisms which have arisen naturally (or may yet so arise). Automaton 
theory is the abstract and precise study of all discrete deterministic devices 
and processes. In so far as mental mechanisms (natural or artificial) can be 
explained in discrete deterministic terms, automaton theory is a convenient 
and valuable source of precise concepts for a broadly conceived theoretical 
psychology. 
A putative important function of mental mechanisms is the control, 
guidance, and regulation of the activities of  larger physical systems of which 
the mental meclhanisms are a part. For a mechanism to be a good guide, 
controller and regulator of a system, the mechanism must possess a good 
model of the system to be controlled, guided or regulated; for a system to be 
a good guide, controller and regulator of itself, it must have access to a good 
model of itself, l'hus, organisms and artificial systems alike must have access 
to information about such properties as their temperature and pressure 
tolerances, their size, strength, endurance, speed, reasoning abilities, etc. in 
order to survive, to move about safely, or to plan wisely. Presumably, the 
more complete and accurate the knowledge of itself which a system can make 
available to itself, the better it can perform, and the more successful it will be. 
In this paper, we explore some ways in which a discrete deterministic 
system can make available to itself information about itself. We concentrate 
on the problem of a system coming to possess logical descriptions of itself 
(e.g. in the sense of Putnam, 1960) of sufficient completeness and accuracy that 
it can simulate its own possible alternative future courses of action. In order 
to speak with some specificity, we model the self-description process in a 
particular Tufing machine format. We will begin by examining the strategy of 
-machine complete self-description enunciated by Lee (1963) and given a 
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definite design by Thatcher (1963). We then identify the sources of some 
possible anomalies and pathologies of the self-description process. Explana- 
tions of empirical psychological or neurological malfunction (by locating 
their possible origins in specific flaws of the underlying automaton system) 
can thus be suggested. We conclude with some brief comment on the 
relevance of the self-description capacity in the development of human 
intelligence and inter-human relations. 
2. COMPLETE SELF-DESCRIPTION 
We begin by considering a Turing machine (a deterministic finite-state 
automaton which has access to an indefinitely expandible tape, a tape which 
the automaton can move to right or left, and upon which it can print 
symbols, and from which it can read). In explicit self-description, the Turing 
automaton is to make available to itself, upon its tape, information on its 
own structural organization (ideally in a form such that the automaton can 
employ this information to simulate its own alternative behaviors). 
Although our discussion will not oblige us to employ any very extensive 
mathematical expositional apparatus, we will, for concreteness, fix upon a 
particular characterization of Turing machines and their descriptions. We will 
employ the 'computer program' characterization proposed by Wang (1957) in 
which Turing machines can be expressed as a fixed finite length program 
composed from the following repertoire of instruction types: P0 (print  a zero 
in the tape square under scan), P1 (print  a one in the tape square under scan), 
R (move right one square of the tape), L (move le f t  one square-of the tape), 
TO, k. (if scanning a zero on the tape go to line k. of the program; otherwise, 
go to the next instruction), T1, k. (if scanning a one on the tape, go to line k. 
of the program; otherwise, go to the next instruction), H (halt action). Wang 
showed that any Turing machine computation can be carried out by machine 
characterized in this 'program' fashion. 
We will wish to describe such Turing machine programs. To do this we 
assign a unique fixed length code word of zeros and ones to each of the basic 
instruction types, and, in addition, to each of the transfer types (TO, k., T1, 
k), we assign its own 'count' code word which (in order to specify the 
location k.) will be repeated a k number of times. A description of a Turing 
machine program will then consist of the sequence of 0,1 code words of each 
ANOMALIES OF SELF-DESCRIPTION 375 
of the instructic, ns in order, while each transfer instruction will also be 
accompanied by a number of count code words giving the transfer locations. 
Fixing upon a specific such code and its details will not be necessary to the 
issues we will herein consider. 
Turing (1936) showed that there is one of his machines which can be 
presented with a coded description of the structure of any of his machines 
and can read and interpret the description and carry out the actions of the 
machine described. Such a universal machine can read its own description, 
interpret it, and simulate what it would do in various alternative circum- 
stances. 
Can a Turing machine, its tape initially blank, provide itself with its own 
complete functional description, suitable for such perusal and exploratory 
self-simulation? Lee (1963) showed that this self-description was possible, 
and Thatcher (1,963) provided a simple design of such a machine. This 
self-describing machine can be viewed as a model of certain sorts of 
psychological introspection, and it is the properties and possible anomalies of 
this model we shall herein explore in some detail. 
We first explain the workings of the self:describing machine. The 
self-describing machine will consist of three distinguishable sub-programs: an 
arbitrary finitely long general processor (which is not vital to the 
self-description strategy but which is necessary if our machine is to make any 
use of its description: the general processor may possess whatever known 
effective procedures we may wish to ascribe to it); an inference routine (the 
properties of which we shall describe below); and a 'simple-minded' printing 
routine or emitter. The emitter will print out upon the initially blank tape a 
description, in the agreed upon 0,1 code, of all of the general processor (if 
one is included) and the inference routine. The structure of the emitter will 
be extremely simple, being composed of alternating R instructions (move 
right on the tape), and either P0 (print zero) or P1 (print one) instructions. 
(If the sequence 010 is to be printed upon the tape, the printer would consist 
of the instructions R-PO-R-P1-R-PO.) Thus, whatever 0,1 sequence describes 
the general processor and the inference routine, an emitter can easily be 
designed which will print out exactly that sequence. 
The self-description process proceeds as follows.Our tri-partite self describ- 
ing machine begins in its emitter routine which prints out upon the initially 
blank tape, a sequence of zeros and ones which is the coded description of 
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the successive instructions of the general processor and the inference routine. 
At this point, all of the Turing machine program, save that of the emitter 
itself, will have been described upon the tape. It is the task of the inference 
routine to supply the deficiency by producing a description of the emitter 
routine. 
The inference routine examines the 0,1 sequence presently inscribed upon 
the tape. If  the first symbol is a 0, the inference routine moves to the end of 
the already printed sequence and prints out the 0,1 code words for an R, and 
for a P0 instruction; if the first symbol is a 1, the inference routine moves to 
the end of the already printed sequence and prints out the 0,1 code words for 
an R, and for aP1 instruction. The inference routine then returns to read the 
second symbol of  the originally printed string, etc. Thus, the inference 
routine is able to supply the (heretofore absent) description of the emitter 
routine, thus completing the description of the machine program, and making 
available to the machine a description of its own program sufficient foi: 
simulation. (It should be clear that it is the especially simple structure of the 
emitter that makes this inference possible and that other suitably simple 
structures could be employed.) 
3. GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS 
We now develop more fully some behavioral implications of the three 
principal organs (general processor, emitter, inferrer) of the self-describing 
system. 
A general processor not equipped with the special sorts of emitter and 
inferrer we have described can yet by itself carry out a wide range of 
complicated mind-like processes, some of these processes making repeated 
(though rudimentary and piecemeal) use of some self-description. This is so 
because every instance of printing of a 0 or a 1 (in our programmed Turing 
machine system, these are produced by P0 and P1 instructions, respectively) 
makes available internally stored information which can then be read by a 
'test and transfer' instruction (in our system T0,k. and Tl,k. instructions). 
Such printing and testing is ubiquitous in any very complex Turing machine 
program (and in any program for a general purpose digital computer) and can 
be a highly special and truncated instance of self-description (if the zeros and 
ones which are printed code for properties of the very system of which they 
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are a part). However, such stored and printed values are usually not present in 
systems in a form sufficiently explicit and complete to permit simulation by 
the system of the possible future actions of the system as a whole. 
The emitter is essentially a distinguishable 'memory'  organ, of a particular 
form. If  stimulated into action it supplies a sequence which, we have seen, 
could be an explicit description (in an agreed upon code) of a large part of 
the system itself. (In yon Neumann's explication of machine self-reproduction 
(yon Neumann, 1966), such units were called pulsers and their role was to 
store and produce on demand whole memory 'chunks', or complete 
instruction sequences, to implement stereotyped actions.) Emitters could also 
contain sets of goals or values or standards which the system as a whole 
contrives to achieve or sustain. ~resent system status, or external input 
information, would be compared with the internally stored goals or values or 
standards, and the system, as a consequence of the detection of those 
comparison differences would work upon the actual state of affairs to reduce 
the discrepancy between the actual state and the stored 'ideals'.) 
If  the emitting units of a system can be altered, so that the emitted 
contents (and thus values, goals, etc.) can be changed, the basis for an 
adaptive system is provided. When the system alters its emitter-stored values 
in such a way that the system performs better (according to some criterion of 
success) then the system, in altering its stored values in this way, is adapting. 
The precise mechanism (presumably including naturai selection as one of 
them) by which such memory organs have been created and loaded (in the 
species and in the individual) and by what means, and upon what occasions 
their contents are revised, is one of the great unsolved problems of biology (as 
well as of psychelogy and philosophy). (A way in which a system can inspect 
itself, obtain its own structural description, and construct an emitter 
containing the description is given in Laing, 1976.) 
The inference t,outine takes descriptions in one coding system and converts 
them to descriptions in another coding system. Thus, the inferrer is more 
generally a transducer (and is related to the decoders and detectors of von 
Neumann's self-reproducing machines). It is composed of a series of 'sensors'  
(test and transfer instructions) which detect individual symbols or sequences 
of them, 'decode :' them, and produce new code word equivalents, or specific 
activities which can stand for the sequences detected. One task of such 
transducing organs is to detect through its sensors, symbols originating 
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external to the system and re-code them for internal system use, in the form 
of descriptions of things. 
4. ANOMALIES AND ABNORMALITIES OF THE SELF-DESCRIPTION 
PROCESS 
We have been explicating the ways in which our principal machine organs can 
be combined and used in modelling various complex system processes with 
special attention being given to the problem of complete structural 
self-description. We now wish to point out how the goal of self-description 
might, through various machine disabilities, completely or partially fail of 
attainment. 
A. In the first set of ways in which the system could fail of our intended 
self-description purpose for it, we concentrate on disabilities of the 
mechanisms underlying the operation of the principal components. In living 
systems, these disabilities would have their counterparts in basic biochemical 
and neurological incapacities. In machines, the flaws would arise at the level 
of the implementation of the individual program instruction types (or the 
functioning of equivalent sub-automata) or in the sequencing or routing of 
program activation (or, at the 'electronic' level, of mis-wiring). We assume 
that the emitter does indeed produce a sequence which under some uniquely 
decipherable coding convention is indeed a description of all or a usably 
substantial part of the remaining system, but there is a failure in the system's 
basic capacities to access and make use of this information. 
(i) The inference routine or the general processor is not equipped to 'read' 
or distinguish the significant symbols produced by the emitter. The emitter 
and the other organs do not 'understand' each other at the level of the 
smallest meaningful units. The description employs one or more symbols Si 
and neither the processor nor the inferrer possess any instruction types of the 
form TSi,k. which can detect and act upon the presence of any Si. The 
description information is available, but the would-be cognizant organs are, at 
a sensory level, blind to it. 
(ii) The emitter produces a description and the process or inferrer can 
detect the symbols of the description, but the result of detecting a symbol is 
a mis-routing of activation to an inappropriate location in the machine or 
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program. For example, a 0 symbol is present, and is (properly) detected by a 
TO,k. ; but the resalting routing of activation is incorrect. This is equivalent to 
an neurological 'crossed-connection'. 
(iii) The emitter produces a description but the rest of the system, though 
it can detect properly the individual symbols of the description, does not 
properly interpret: the resulting code words: where, for example, 001 might 
actually code for a P1, the system acts upon it as if it were another sort of 
instruction entirely. 
(iv) The emitter produces a description but the inference routine may not 
be designed to infer the form that the emitter as a matter of fact takes; for 
example, the inference routine may be designed to assume that the emitter is 
always of the 'standard' R-Pi-R-Pi . . .  form when, in fact, it is of the 
functionally equivalent but redundant form R-L-R-Pt-R-L-R-Pi. . .  In general, 
different emitters or different parts of the same emitter system may employ 
different structural conventions, and a routine which must infer emitter 
structure from emitter output must be designed to be aware of each emitter's 
structure conventions. 
(v) The emitter produces a description but the system can not make use 
of it because the reading of the code words begins at the wrong place (a 
'frameshift' error) or, for example, the description sequence is read in reverse. 
B. Another set of ways in which the system could fail of our intended 
purpose for it of complete accurate self-description would arise owing to the 
ultimate finiteness of every machine physical property. That is, departing 
from the ideal features of a Turing machine, any actual machine will have an 
upper bound on 1:he amount of tape available, on the length of persistence of 
inscribed symbols, on the rate or accuracy at which symbols can be read and 
interpreted. 
(i) The emitter produces a sequence which is indeed an accurate and 
complete descriFtion of all of the rest of the machine, and the machine is 
equipped to read the individual symbols and to interpret the code words, and 
infer the emitter structure, but the symbols of the emitted sequence do not 
persist long enough to be read and interpreted completely. As a consequence 
the self-knowledge attainable by the system is piecemeal, intermittent, and 
disorganized. 
(ii) As with (i), the emitted description is accurate and complete, and the 
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system is properly equipped to read and interpret individual symbols and 
code words, but the 'tape' space within the system is not large enough to 
accommodate the whole emitted description, or large enough to hold both 
the emitted description and the inferred description of the emitter. In effect, 
the system can introspect clearly and methodically but owing to limited tape 
'work space' available to the system, it must, for example, constantly transfer 
its successful results to an 'outside' medium. If original tape space is 
exceeded, and the emitter output rate exceeds the rate of transfer to an 
auxiliary storage medium or if emitter produced information continues to 
overflow and be lost while the system transfers earlier information to another 
medium, or if (as is likely in the analogous psychological situation) there is no 
adequate coding scheme for faithfully recording internal events in a more 
'public' external form, then there will be a loss in either completeness or 
accuracy of self-description. 
(iii) The description emitted is accurate and complete, and the system is 
equipped to employ it, but, in addition to the information provided by the 
description emitter, the output of other symbol producing organs is also 
'printed' in the tape space, so that, in the absence of appropriate 
discriminatory circuitry, 'cross-talk' confuses and corrupts the self-description 
capacity. 
(iv) The description emitted is accurate and complete, but the system 
suffers from a 'punctuation' incapacity; that is, in reading and interpreting 
the machine might lose track of the boundaries between the examined and 
unexamined portions of the sequence. After an emitter has produced a 
sequence which is a description of some or all of the remaining part of the 
system, the inference routine must read and interpret all and only the 
description sequence in inferring the composition of the organ or organs 
which produced the sequence. To accomplish this the inference routine must 
be guided, or arrange to guide itself, by means of various fixed and shifting 
markers or punctuation marks. For example, the inference routine must be 
able to detect where the emitted sequence begins and where it ends; it must 
also be able to distinguish what it has already read from the as yet unread. 
Such 'punctuation' incapacity might lead the inference routine 'neurotically' 
to read, and interpret, re-read and re-interpret, the same symbol or symbol 
sequence indefinitely. 
(If we can ascribe to the general processor some capacity for observing and 
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evaluating its own actions, such simple 'neurosis' might be detected and 
brought to a halt. Consider however the following slightly more subtle 
punctuation disability, where the end marker of the emitted sequence is lost 
or undetectable. In this case, after the inference routine has successfully read 
and interpreted the complete originally emitted string, it will fail to halt and 
return control to the general processor, but may begin to read and interpret 
the very sequence produced by itself. Since the interpretation of each symbol 
is several symbols long the (pseudo) description will grow longer and longer, 
the inference routine reading and interpreting its own output, but never 
re-reading the same location. In this 'neurotic' behavior, the futility of the 
repeated inference is much harder to detect, and again, as with the simpler 
example, an attempt to use the resulting supposed description would be 
disastrous relative to an intended self-simulation.) 
5. OMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INADEQUACIES OF SELF- 
DESCRIBING SYSTEMS 
In the last section we pointed out many of the ways in which a machine 
system which was to provide itself with a description of itself could fail of 
that goal. We discussed fundamental disabilities of 'sensory' detection and of 
'wiring', as well as limitations of system capacity and difficulties arising out 
of 'punctuation" accidents. There are other ways in which a system can fail to 
succeed in the self-description process, among them, inadequacies or 
omissions in the content or overall organization of the would-be self- 
describing system. For example, we have heretofore in this paper considered 
only cases where all three basic organs were present and where the emitter has 
been capable of producing a description of all of the rest of the system; the 
failings of the system were owing to local incapacity to make appropriate use 
of this information. In this present section we consider what might occur if 
the emitter could not always provide a description of all of the remaining 
parts of the system or if one or another of our three basic organs was 
inoperative or missing entirely. 
Suppose we ihave a system composed of a general processor, an inference 
routine, and an emitter which can produce the description of the general 
processor (but not of the inference routine). The emitter will produce a 
description of the processor, and the inference routine can produce a 
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description of the emitter. Can the system come to know it also contains an 
inference routine and obtain its description? 
The actions required of our general processor may be very difficult to 
achieve. The processor must examine the description before it and be able to 
ascertain that it is a description of itself and of an emitter of  the description 
of itself, that existence of the described emitter can account for the 
description of the general processor but that nothing in the general processor 
description accounts for the description of the emitter. It must deduce this 
from the existence of an heretofore undescribed part of the system. From the 
sequence which must be accounted for (the description of the emitter) it 
must deduce the structure of the inference routine which could, from the 
description of the general processor, produce this. In effect, the general 
processor must contain effective procedures which from particular behavioral 
consequences of machines deduce the structure which produced the 
sequence, a problem which in general is not recursively solvable (but which 
may be solvable, with suitable constraints, in the particular case at hand). 
For our next example, let us suppose that the system consists of a general 
processor and an inference routine, and an emitter of the description of the 
inference routine (but no description of the processor). Then the emitter 
could produce a description of the inference routine, and the inference 
routine could produce the description of the emitter, but the system would 
not have a description of the general processor. The general processor would 
have to try to deduce the existence of itself and its description with the help 
only of the inference routine. It could take the emitter inference behavior as a 
model, but this might be very misleading, for then it would only be able to 
infer that within itself there were routines which produced symbols upon the 
tape, and it would in general be incorrect to assume that print routines 
originating in the processor had the same simple form as those of a standard 
emitter. It would seem that the processor must largely remain at a loss in its 
attempts to determine its own nature. (In the general case it could not even 
always decide correctly, given a sample of some of its behavioral conse- 
quences, whether a proffered description was indeed a description of itself.) 
I t  is especially interesting to consider the sorts of systems which result 
when a general processor is combined with an emitter of the general processor 
description (but there is no inference capacity) and when a general processor 
is combined with a description inference routine (but there is no special 
emitter of the description of the processor and inference routine). 
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Considering first the case where the system consists of a general processor 
and an emitter of the description of the processor and of an inference routine 
(which however is not actually present), the emitter can produce the 
description of the processor and the inference routine, and the general 
processor can interpret the description of the inference routine and so deduce 
the description of the emitter which produced the description. Thus, this 
omission of the inference routine need not be a bar to the production of a 
complete accurate description of the system. 
In the case of a processor combined with an emitter of its description (but 
no inferrer), the processor will have access to and can use the description of 
itself, but it will be 'blind' to the existence of the emitter which produced the 
description. In many respects the processor can get along well without a 
detailed description of the emitter part of the system, or even the 
knowleddge that it exists} (But as with consciousness though, the processor, 
could it think about it, may feel a bit uneasy making use of a very personal 
phenomenon the origin of which forever eludes it.) 
If  a general processor is combined with a description inference routine 
(but the system lacks any emitter of a complete accurate description of the 
processor and inferrer) the ability to produce a self-description useable in 
system self-simulation is (as we have indicated earlier in the section) very 
unlikely. The general processor might in the course of its computational 
actions produce sequences of symbols upon the tape, but the source of these 
symbols could not necessarily be inferred and described by the inference 
routine, and there would be no guarantee that vast regions of the general 
processor did not exist which, since they cast no symbols on the tape-screen 
available to the reference routine, could never be described or their existence 
even disclosed 
6. SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
We have presented first, an ideal state of affairs by which a system can make 
available to itself a complete structural description of itself. We then 
considered some ways in which such an ideal state of affairs might be 
perturbed. We now wish briefly to consider what seems to be the actual state 
of affairs for human, externally unaided, self-description, framing our 
remarks, where appropriate, in the machine terminology we have introduced. 
Humans seem to possess general processors by which as largely unconscious 
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machines much of life's activities can successfully be carried forward. There is 
also probably some rudimentary capacity, by means of emitter-like storage 
devices (devies which can be stimulated to emit whole sequences) to bring 
forth more or less elaborate images of the self, and of the self in the context 
of past, present, and proposed future actions. In attempts to introspect as to 
the nature and organization of our minds, we can have little assurance that 
what can be emitted reflects, in any very useful form, all or even much of the 
rest of our mental mechanism. We can be (and are) thus constantly surprised 
at the arousal of memories we did not know we possessed, and by the sudden 
activation of disused or forgotten or unsuspected parts of the general 
processor (although by middle-age few new faculties or capabilities announce 
themselves). Our inferential apparatus, in so far as emitter and processor 
activity is apparent to it, is reluctant to act; its timidity is undoubtedly 
justified since though it can deduce (rather tentatively) that the actions it is 
aware of must have sources, there is little certainty about the logical form 
these sources might take, and it assuredly does not know for certain that 
these sources must fall into a 'standard' structural pattern readily deducible 
from their behavioral properties. Thus complete and accurate self-description 
of the sort we have shown possible for machines is not presently possible for 
humans (and perhaps never was and never will be). 
There is however considerable pressure upon humans (and perhaps even 
upon natural organisms very generally) to improve and to enlarge their 
capacity for useful self-description. We have long been advised to know 
ourselves, and in contemporary jargon we are urged to 'find out who we are' 
and to 'get in touch with ourselves'. Solicitous elders constantly harangue the 
young to develop foresight and to learn to plan their lives wisely; professional 
moralists urge us to empathize with others by seeing ourselves in others; 
engineers of  society and self insist we constantly submit ourselves to our own 
intense scrutiny and criticism; and poets wish themselves and us to see 
ourselves as others see us. Clearly, some considerable available capacity to 
produce useable accurate models of the self as well as the means to improve 
that capacity is presupposed. 
Quite apart from such conscious humanely intended exhortations, the 
indifferent natural selection pressures of evolution may have promoted an 
elaboration of the self-description capacity. Hamilton (1964) has pointed out 
that a trait for 'altruism' if it arises, would presumably be disadvantageous to 
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the bearer; if however the altruistic trait was coupled with a capacity to 
recognize those individuals genetically related to the bearer, and to confine 
aid to them, then the trait would probably spread in the population (those 
who persistently helped their kind would enhance the production of more of 
this genetically-selfish helping kind). There is considerable evidence that 
'altruism' (of this genetically-selfish sort) exists, parental care and nepotistic 
concern being only the most obvious and pervasive forms of it, and this trait 
can persist only in so far as its bearers possess a means to detect in others 
genuine (i.e. genel:ic) similarity to self. 
Since genes themselves are not readily open to direct inspection, organisms 
possessing only superficial likeness can take advantage of the altruistic traits 
of others. It is thus evolutionarily advantageous that individuals of the altruist 
persuasion constantly improve their discriminatory powers and in addition 
impose, if they can, increasingly severe sanctions upon would-be parasitic 
members of the larger population deceitfully posing as related fellow altruists. 
Alexander (1975) has pointed out that this situation is undoubtedly 
further complicated by two additional factors. First, it is likely that most 
humans simultaneously possess both altruistic and parasitic traits, and second, 
parasitism will likely be most successful if its possessors are largely blind to 
this 'immoral' aspect of themselves. 
In our presentations of various machine self-description strategies, we have 
usually assumed that any descriptions of the rest of the system produced by 
the emitter are indeed correct descriptions and that the 'proper' function of 
the inference mechanism is to implement a complete as well as correct 
description. For an organism (or a machine) existing in and reacting with a 
complex environment of other organisms or machines and being 'naturally' 
selected upon according to continued reproductive success, a complete and 
correct description of the self may not necessarily be the most advantageous. 
Of course, if the machine or organism is designed to operate under the 
assumption that the emitter apparatus makes available to it a complete and 
correct description of itself, and the description is grossly and constantly 
incorrect, then attempts to produce prudent appropriate behavior on the 
basis of the dist:orted notion of self would generally be disastrous to the 
bearer. Alexander's analysis suggests however that the 'normal' state of affairs 
is one in which there is a compromise between accuracy and completeness on 
the one hand and distortion and omission of self-description on the other. 
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The more accurate and complete the description then ideally more wisely we 
can behave; but  our present and past experience of  survival from moment  to 
moment  and generation to generation has perhaps produced a genetic pol icy 
of  partial ignorance and distortion. An incorrect or partial self-description 
(which can exist within us in multiple differing forms) does not usually 
diverge from reality to the extent  that gross performance and viability are 
constantly and directly threatened. Indeed we can assume that the blind spots 
and distortions of  our not ion of ourselves must have had survival value and 
may still have. The produced self-description is usually faulty, but  often 
despite this, quite comforting. Relying upon it may sometimes produce 
bafflement,  but  rarely disaster. Calculation of  future courses of  action, based 
on our beliefs about our capabilities and nature often prove inaccurate and 
disappointing; assumptions about one's strength, size, comeliness, and mental 
acumen fall wide of the mark, when tested in the world. Although the 
psychic consequences of  such failures can lead to desperate at tempts to 
reconcile this strange state of  affairs, and even to despair, we usually find 
ourselves too busy, just  getting along, to dwell long upon it. 
The University o f  Michigan, Ann Arbor 
NOTES 
*This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation. 
l'PhysiologicaUy' the absence of an inference routine would be disastrous. Let us 
suppose the machine reproduced itself 'consciously' on the basis of the (partial) 
description provided by the emitter. Then the processor would be reproduced, but not 
the 'hidden' emitter of the description of the processor. The offspring processor would 
thus not make available to itself a description of itself for use in simulation and 
guidance, and in turn could not itself reproduce at all. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alexander, R.D., 1975, 'The Search for a General Theory of Behavior', Behavioral 
Science 20 (2), 77-100 (esp. p. 97). 
Hamilton, W. D., 1964, 'The Genetical Theory of Social Behavior (I and II), £ Theor. 
BioL 7, 1-16, 17-32. 
Laing, R.A., 1976, 'Automaton Introspection', J. Comp. and Systems Sci. 31 (2), 
172-183. 
Lee, C. Y., 1963, 'A Turing Machine Which Prints its Own Code Script', Mathematical 
Theory of Automata, Polytechnic Press, Brooklyn, New York, pp. 155-164. 
ANOMALIES OF SELF-DESCRIPTION 387 
Putnam, H., 1960, 'Minds and Machines', Dimensions of Mind, ed. by Sidney Hook, New 
York University Press, New York, pp. 148-179. 
Thatcher, James, 1963, 'The Construction of a Self-Describing Turing Machine', 
Mathematical Theory of Automata, Polytechnic Press, Brooklyn, New York, 
pp. 165-171. 
Turing, A.M., 1936 'On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungspioblem', Proc. of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 42, 
230-265. 
von Neumann, J., 1966, Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata, edited and completed 
by A. W. Burks, University of IUinois Press. 
Wang, H., 1957, 'A Variant to Turing's Theory of Computing Machines', Z Assoc. 
Comput. Mach. 4, 63-93. 
